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Human rights and employment law
by Bob Hepple QC
A successful young practitioner said to 
me the other day, 'There are fashions in 
law, and the current vogue is for "human 
rights."' Soon   as a result of the 
incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
into domestic law   we are likely to have 
human rights points raised in many 
criminal cases, and in some civil ones. 
Employment law will not be immune 
from this fashion, and we can expect 
arguments to be framed under both 
statutory and common law jurisdictions 
in employment tribunals and the 
ordinary courts, so as to raise questions 
under the ECHR.
Is this simply a fashion likely to pass 
away once the novelty has worn off, or 
does it represent a shift in the ideological 
basis of employment law and a new 
source of principle for the development 
of the subject? In particular, will the 
incorporation of the ECHR into UK law 
increase the real rights of workers ino
unequal employment relationships, or 
will it   in the words of Eord McCluskey 
(H E Deb, 3 November 1997, co. 1266) 
  simply redraw the law in 'vague, 
imprecise and high-sounding 
statements'? A Canadian commentator 
(McAdam, Canadian Labour Law, 
para. 3 1240) has reflected that human 
rights challenges in labour matters under 
the Canadian Charter have been 
'spectacularly unsuccessful' but that in 
the process 'large sums of time, money, 
and legal expertise have been expended'. 
Will conditional fees, or legally-aidedo J
public interest litigation in the UK (as
envisaged in the ECD's consultation 
paper Access to Justice with conditional Jees, 
March 1998) on human rights in 
employment yield tangible benefits to 
anyone apart from the lawyers?
FAILURE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LITIGATION
It is, of course, striking that 
traditionally, human rights have seemed 
to disappear from sight when individuals 
enter the private sphere of the labour 
market. It is worth remembering that 
until the early 1970s leading textbooks 
still acknowledged the power of a master 
to administer 'reasonable chastisement' 
to an apprentice! In the UK we have now 
got rid of such abuses and also slavery, 
servitude and forced or compulsory 
labour. The ECHR exempts military 
service from these prohibitions, as the 
boy soldiers who had joined the army 
with parental consent at the ages of 15 or 
16 and remained bound until they were 
aged 17 found in 1968, when the 
European Commission on Human Rights 
rejected their claim of servitude or 
forced labour (W v UK (1968) YB 562). 
Human rights lawyers will no doubt cast 
their eyes over the jobseekers' 
regulations, as the new deal on welfare to 
work results in the denial of benefits to 
those who refuse work or training. But it 
is to be noted that the regulations permit 
a claimant to refuse a job on the grounds 
that it offends a sincere religious belief or 
conscientious objection   a recognition 
of the possible application of art. 9 and 
10 of the ECHR. As regards 
'conscientious objections', British social 
security tribunals are unlikely to be any 
more sympathetic than the Commission 
was to the Dutch claimant whose 
objection to taking a job was that the only 
suitable work for him was that of 
'independent social scientist or social 
critic' (Talmon v The Netherlands [1997] 
EHRER 448). Those of us who are 
happily engaged in that occupation 
should not look to the ECHR for 
protection!
One of the most fundamental of all 
human rights   to equal treatment and 
respect   entered employment law just
30 years ago in the Race Relations Act 
1968, three years after racial 
discrimination in places of public resort 
had been made unlawful. It was 1975 
before sex discrimination in employment 
and other spheres, was outlawed, and 
1996 before a timid Disability 
Discrimination Act came into force. The 
European Court of Justice   here echoing 
the case law of Strasbourg Human Rights 
Commission and Court   has in the 
recent Grant v SW Trains case (Case 
249/96); [1998] IRER 206)ended any 
hope of developing gay and lesbian rights 
through case law. Despite the Eabour 
Party's manifesto commitment to deal 
with age discrimination, the Government 
has now indicated that it favours a 
voluntary approach: no fundamental 
right then for those rejected because of 
stereotypical assumptions about 40 and 
50-somethings who are forced through 
premature selection for redundancy into 
a life of humilating poverty and loss of 
status.
Religious discrimination
We have no law against religious 
discrimination in employment apart from 
in Northern Ireland. Remember the 
1981 case of the unfortunate Mr Ahmad, 
a school teacher of Muslim faith who was 
bound by his contract to work on Friday 
afternoons. He wanted 45 minutes off to 
attend the local mosque for prayers. Eord 
Denning (Ahmad v ILEA [1978] QB 36) 
said that:
'it would do the Muslim community no 
good to be given preferential treatment ... I 
see nothing in the European Convention to 
give Mr Ahmad the right to manifest his 
religion on Friday afternoon in derogation of 
his contract of employment.'
Eord Justice Scarman dissented and 
said that a 45-minute absence to manifest 
his religion was not a breach of contract 
in the light of art. 9 of the ECHR. Mr 
Ahmad got no joy out of the European 
Commission on Human Rights which 
held that there had been no violation of 
art. 9 because he was contractually bound 
to work ((1981) 4 EHRR 126). More 
recently, an employee of Christian faith 
who was dismissed because she was not 19
prepared to agree to a change in her 
terms of employment requiring her to 
work on Sundays failed in her application 
to the European Commission on Human 
Rights alleging a violation of art. 9. Nor 
did Sunday working constitute a violation 
of her right to family life under art. 8 
(Stedman v UK (1997) 23 EHRR DC 
168). While the right to opt out of 
Sunday working is now guaranteed for 
shop and betting workers by legislation, 
the narrow interpretations of the ECHR 
hold out little hope for other workers 
who do not wish to work on Sundays, or 
for workers of other recognised faiths 
with different Sabbath days.
Although art. 14 of the ECHR
O
contains a wider list of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination than in UK 
law   including language, religion,o o o o
political or other opinion, social origin, 
association with a national minority, 
property, birth or status   it will have 
little immediate impact. This is because 
art. 14 is not a free standing right; it is 
derivative and no claims to unequal 
treatment can be made except in 
conjunction with one of the specified 
rights, quite different in this respect 
from the 14th amendment to the US 
Constitition ( the equal protection of the 
laws) or the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenants 
on Civil and Political and on Social and 
Economic Rights, which contain 
independent guarantees of the right to 
equality.
LIMITED RIGHTS ON SUNDAY 
WORKING
While the right to opt out of Sunday 
working is now guaranteed for shop and 
betting workers by legislation, the narrow 
interpretations of the ECHR hold out little 
hope for other workers who do not wish to 
work on Sundays or for workers of other 
recognised faiths with different Sabbath 
days.
Freedom of association
Another human right is freedom of 
association. This has been singled outo
since 1919 in the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation 
(IEO), and was reiterated in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ILOo '
Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 and 
in key ILO Conventions, as well as in
other international instruments, as one 
of the most fundamental of all human 
rights. But it receives only patchy 
recognition in UK lawr. The most 
notorious case was that of the 
Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) workers 
deprived in 1984, after 40 years, of their 
right to belong to a trade union. Because 
the ECHR was not then part of domestic 
law, the only way that this blatant 
violation of the freedom to associate 
could be challenged was by way of 
judicial review on the grounds of a failure 
to consult the trade unions on the change 
of status. This challenge failed becauseo
the Law Lords accepted that Mrs 
Thatcher genuinely feared a threat to 
national security and they regarded this 
as a reason for judicial restraint (Council 
oj Civil Service Unions v Minister jor the Civil 
Service [1985] AC 374). It was only when 
the matter reached the European 
Commission that art. 11 (1) of the ECHR 
came directly into issue, and even this 
proved incapable of protecting the right 
to belong to a trade union. The mosto
surprising feature of the decision of the 
European Commission on Human 
Rights, in declaring the complaint 
inadmissible, was the scant attention 
paid to the distinction which the ILO 
committees drew between the right to 
belong to a union and the 'exercise' of 
that right ((1987) 10 EHRR 269). 
Article 11(2) of the ECHR allows lawful 
restrictions only on the 'exercise' of the 
right, and does not contemplate a total 
abolition   a point later recognised by 
the committee of independent experts 
under the European Social Charter.
Another example of the incomplete 
protection of the freedom of association 
is the Wilson and Palmer cases where a 
majority in the House of Lords   
through an incredibly narrow and 
historically inaccurate interpretation of 
the legislation   held that discrimination 
against trade unionists who refuse to 
forego their right to uniono o
representation by signing so-called 
'personal' contracts, is not a violation of 
the right to belong to or to participate in 
the activities of a trade union (Associated 
Newspapers Ltd v Wilson [1995] IRLR 
298). Wilson and Palmer's complaints 
have now been declared admissible by 
the European Commission on Human 
Rights. The UK Government may settle 
the proceedings and amend the 
legislation. If the matter goes to court,o o
the outcome is by no means certain. In a 
line of cases decided in the 1970s, the 
court construed art. 11(1) in a narrow 
way, allowing states a free choice of 
means used to make it possible for trade 
union members to protect their 
interests. So art. 11(1) does not secure 
any particular treatment of trade unions; 
neither the right to negotiate nor the 
right to be consulted. Recently, in 
Gustaffsson v Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR 
409, the court said that while art. 11(1) 
does not guarantee a right to engage in 
collective bargaining, it also does noto o'
guarantee the employer's right to refuse 
to do so. So the Court of Human Rights 
in the Wilson and Palmer cases will have 
the unenviable task of balancing the 
employees' positive right to associate 
against the employers' negative freedom 
not to associate.
FAILURE TO MEET 
OBLIGATIONS
These instances illustrate the point 
that core human rights such as equality 
and freedom of association remain 
incomplete, incoherent and ineffectively 
enforced, falling short of the UK's
O
obligations under the Internationalo
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and under the Covenant on Social and 
Economic Rights. Moreover, the 
illustrations also indicate that the right of 
individual petition to Strasbourg alleging 
violation of Convention rights has 
yielded little of substance to domestic 
employment law; on the whole, the 
results have been spectacularly 
unsuccessful. Exceptions to the general 
trend are Alison Halford, who recently 
after 6 years secured £10,000 
compensation for telephone tapping at 
work contrary to her right to private life 
under art. 8, and the local government 
officers who recently had their complaint 
upheld that the restrictions on their 
political activities violated art. 10.
The question now is whether bringing 
these rights home will make a difference.o
I believe it will for two reasons. First, it 
will mark an important ideological divide 
from the period of neo-liberal 'market' 
employment law (1979 97) from which 
we are now emerging, and also from theo o'
earlier period of collective laissez-faire, 
which lasted from 1906-1979 with a 
brief interlude under the Heath 
Government's IRA 1971 74. Secondly, 
international and European-level human 
rights will provide a rich source of
principle, not only for statutory 
interpretation but also for the 
development of the common law of 
employment.
AN IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT
Sandra Fredman has pointed out that:
'an important element in the success of the 
labour law of the Thatcher years was its 
ideological power.' (1992) 12 OJLS 24)
The Labour Government has started 
the process of developing an alternative 
strategy. This was symbolised by the 
restoration of the right to belong to a 
trade union at GCHQ, although 
significantly, recognition of unions there 
was tied to a 'no disruption' agreement. 
Much remains to be done to meet 
criticisms of British employment law by 
the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association and the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations. 
Legislation will be required to prevent 
discrimination against workers who do 
not wish to give up collective bargaining, 
ending the right of employers to dismiss 
striking employees without those 
employees having the right to complain 
of unfair dismissal, and restoring trade 
union autonomy to discipline members 
who do not abide by majority decisions. 
We shall be able to see how far the 
government is willing to go down this 
road when it publishes the long-expected 
white paper on Fairness at Work.
The conception of 'human rights'   
that is those moral rights which one has 
simply because one is a human being   is 
a crucial part of the underpinning of such 
a strategy. In a globalised market 
economy, undergoing rapid technological 
change, direct foreign investment and 
intensive product market competition, 
national states have few defences against 
social dumping or the race to the bottom 
in labour standards. This is why the 
Director-General of the ILO has been 
arguing since 1994 that the liberalisation 
of trade must be accompanied by respect 
for fundamental human rights in the 
workplace, as defined in seven core ILO 
conventions: freedom of association and 
collective bargaining (1948, No. 87 and 
1949, No. 98) forced labour (1930, 
No 29 and 1957, No. 105) 
non-discrimination (1951, No. 100 and 
1958, No. Ill) and the minimum age in 
employment (1973, No. 138).
These seven conventions do not in
themselves provide a unique and 
comprehensive set of definitions of core 
labour standards. For example, 
convention No. 138 provides for a 
minimum employment age while 
remaining silent on the possibility of 
non-exploitative forms of child labour. 
Nor is it clear why these conventions and 
not others relevant to social dumping 
have been selected   such as Convention 
No. 131 of 1970 (minimum wage-fixing 
machinery), the numerous conventions 
on occupational health and safety, and 
Convention No. 81 of 1947 on labour 
inspection.
FEW DEFENCES
The conception of 'human rights'   
that is those moral rights which oneo
has simply because one is a human 
being   is a crucial part of the 
underpinning of such a strategy. 
In a globalised market economy, 
undergoing rapid technological 
change, direct foreign investment and 
intensive product market 
competition, national states have few 
defences against social dumping or 
the race to the bottom in labour 
standards.
The ILO's efforts are now being 
matched by worldwide campaigns by 
NGOs for 'social labelling' of products to 
signify that they have not been produced 
by child labour or other exploitative 
forms of work violating the core 
conventions, and by attempts to get 
'social clauses' into trading agreements 
and the new multilateral agreement on 
investment. To date these campaigns have 
been unsuccessful, but they represent a 
growing international movement for
o o
human rights at work.
British contribution
The British contribution to this 
development has to take place within the 
framework of the European Union. One 
of the striking features of the EU and EC 
treaties is the absence of substantive 
protection of fundamental civil and social 
rights. For this there are both political 
and ideological reasons. I shall not 
attempt to unravel the politics of the EU, 
but ideologically, from 1957 until 
enlargement in 1973, the ideology of the 
common market was functionalist based 
on common economic needs for free
movement of capital, labour, goods and 
services. Questions of social justice and 
human rights were separated; social 
advance would come through changing 
the economic base. One of the great 
lessons of the 20th century is that 
economic determinism is an ideology 
which simply does not work.
This lesson was only partly absorbed 
after 1973. We entered a phase ol 
neo-functionalism: a continued emphasis 
on economic activity, but a growing 
realisation that economics and politics, 
economic and social development, 
cannot be separated. However, while 
human rights, including social and 
economic ones, were acknowledged   
e.g. in the preamble to the Single European 
Act 1986   they remained subservient to 
economic integration.
It was left to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg to develop 
some protection of fundamental human 
rights. At first the court resisted such a 
development, but from Stauder v City of 
Ulm (Case 29/69) [1969] ECR 419 
onwards, it became more receptive to the 
protection of property rights and the 
freedom to pursue a trade or profession. 
Later, following the series of Defrenne 
cases (Defrenne v Belgium state ( case 
80/70) [1971] ECR 445; CNR 8137; 
Defrenne v Beige de Navigation Aerienne 
(SABENA) (Defrenne II) ( case 43/75) 
[1976] ECR 455; CMR 8346; Defrenne v 
SA Beige de Navigation Aerienne (SABENA) 
(Defrenne III) (case 149/177) [1975] ECR 
1365; CRM 8500) the right of men and 
women to equal treatment was 
categorised as a fundamental right 
protected as a general principle of EC 
law.
It has been remarked that the ECJ 
discovered the protection of human 
rights as a general principle of EC law so 
as to prevent national courts from defying 
EC law. Joe Weiler perceptively 
comments that:
'the surface language of the Courts in 
Stauder is the language of human rights ... 
The deep structure is all about supremacy. It 
was an attempt to protect the concept of 
supremacy threatened because of the apparent 
(largely theoretical) inadequate protection of 
human rights in the original treaty systems.' 
(Human Rights in the EC (1990), p. 
580-1)
But whatever the court's motivation, 
there can be no doubt that the 21
development of human rights   in 
particular, but not limited to, equality   
has been of profound importance. Think, 
for example, of Johnstone v RUC (Case 
222/84) [1986] ECR 1651, where the 
chiet constable was prevented by the 
court from shielding behind a national 
security certificate to exclude the 
jurisdiction to review a decision not to 
renew female reservists' employment 
contracts because of the policy of not 
arming them. The requirement of 
judicial control under art. 6 of the ECHR 
was held to be part of the constitutional 
traditions of the member states, and 
national law was therefore assessed in the 
light of the ECHR, even though the 
convention had not been incorporated 
into domestic UK law. Moreover, the 
court has required member states to 
implement EC rules in a way which 
respects fundamental human rights, even 
though the Community measure did not 
itself embody those rights; nor can a 
member state derogate from Community 
rules on grounds of a national policy, 
where that policy conflicts with 
fundamental human rights. As soon as 
legislation enters the field of application 
of EC law, the ECJ   not the national 
court   becomes the sole arbiter of 
whether fundamental rights have beeno
secured. 
Common code
So what we are seeing is the 
development   in Attorney General 
Jacobs' words   of a 'common code of 
fundamental values' in the EU, and these 
make it almost inevitable that, quite apart 
from the incorporation of ECHR, 
domestic law will increasingly be based 
on the ideological foundation of 
fundamental human rights. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam continues this process with 
its express reference in the preamble to 
respect for human rights and also to 
respect for the European Social Charter, 
with provisions for sanctions against 
member states who violate such rights.o
The new art. 13 of the EC Treaty \videns 
the competence of the Community to 
take action against a variety of forms of 
discrimination, although this is limited to 
situations where there is already a basis 
for Community action   i.e. 'within the 
scope of application of the Treaty'.
Much cyberspace and printed material 
has been expended   by myself included 
  on the debate about the scope of 
fundamental rights. The ECHR's rights 
are limited, and in some respects
outdated, with the prospects of 
amendment made more difficult by the 
accession of manv new member states 
(now 40) to the Council of Europe. The 
European Social Charter (1961), 
although recently revised (1996) and 
with improved reporting systems, 
remains an unenforceable 'footnote' to 
the convention. So it is important to see 
incorporation not as an end in itself but 
as a means to an end. Much rights talk is 
rhetorical and, as we have seen from the 
ECJ, may really be serving particular 
interests in a struggle for power. Humanoo 1
rights acquire meanings only in specific 
social and political contexts. Eabour 
movements in the 19th century sought 
civil and political rights so as to enable 
them to use state power against the worst 
excesses of economic power. Women and 
ethnic minorities have used the right to 
equality to challenge patriarchy and 
institutionalised racism. Many people 
hope that incorporation will enable the 
judges to do for them what Parliament, 
the administration and the judges have 
not. In this they may be mistaken. 
Incorporation of the ECHR will enable 
these and other groups to advance the 
cause of human rights and, bv so doing,
O ' J CV
to help create a culture of human rights. 
But they should not expect that 




This brings me to the second question, 
that of human rights as a source of legal 
principle in employment law. We must 
remind ourselves that the ECHR is 
concerned only with abuses of human 
rights by public authorities. The Human 
Rights Bill will, therefore, entrench a new 
hierarchy of rights in domestic law 
between public and private employees. 
Remedies will be available only against 
public authorities in their capacity' as 
employers. There will be no direct 
sanctions against private employers who 
act in a way which is incompatible with 
convention rights, such as freedom of 
expression, the right to private life, or 
freedom of association. I shall not 
attempt here to discuss the definition in 
the Bill of public authorities: there will be 
elephants and non-elephants and a large 
number of animals in between which are 
difficult to classify; In my view, the 
government was right not to list the 
authorities covered in a schedule. 
Although there is a lack of certainty as a
result, the courts will have the 
opportunity to deal with an expanding 
number of employers whose functions 
are of a 'public nature' on a case by case 
basis.
Despite the limitation to public 
authorities, incorporation will have a 
profound effect on private employment 
as well. First, legislation must be 
interpreted 'so far as possible' to give 
effect to the ECHR, and where this 
cannot be done a court may grant a 
declaration of incompatibility. Secondly, 
the courts and tribunals   who are 
themselves designated as public 
authorities   are required to act 
compatibly with convention rights. This 
means that the common law will be 
developed in cases between private 
employers and employees so as to give 
effect to convention rights.
Right to private life
Eet me take as an example, the right to 
private life under art. 8. The Halford case 
(1997) EHRLR 540, clearly establishes 
that the protection afforded by this 
article applies to the workplace. 
Halford's right to private life was 
infringed by the interception of her 
telephone calls, even though these calls 
had been made from the employer's 
premises, in the employer's time and 
using the employer's own internal 
communications system. This opens up 
for scrutiny many other modern 
employment practices, e.g. video 
surveillance, drug testing, psychometric- 
testing, etc.
At first sight this applies only to 
employees of public authorities. But 
might not a common law argument be 
developed along the following lines? The 
House of Eords has now endorsed in 
Malik v BCCI [1997] IRER 462, that it is 
an implied term of every contract of 
employment that the employer will not:
'without reasonable and proper cause, 
conduct itself in a manner calculated and 
likely to destroy or seriously damage the 
relationship of confidence and trust between 
employer and employee.'
It is clear from Malik that it is not 
necessary to show that the trust- 
destroying conduct was directly targeted 
at the employee, nor are the employer's 
motives relevant. Nor need the employee 
have known of the trust-destroying 
conduct at the time. I suggest that since 
the court must act compatibly with 
convention rights, the duty of trust and
confidence also embodies a duty to 
respect the Convention rights of an 
employee. This may be regarded as 
horizontal enforcement of the 
Convention by the backdoor, but it seems 
to me altogether legitimate and strongly 
arguable.
CONCLUSION
My conclusion is that the 
domestication of the ECHR will giveo
workers an opportunity to win some new 
rights in areas in which Parliament has 
failed to legislate, such as the right to 
private life and freedom of expression, 
and that the exclusion of rights to 
collective bargaining and to strike is, at 
worst, neutral in effect, leaving employers 
and unions free to pursue their aims by 
social and political means. Statutory 
interpretation and the common law will 
benefit by being redrawn in categoriesJ o o
which reflect fundamental social values. 
The judges will have an opportunity to 
import into the private employment 
relationship the public law aims of 
protecting the dignity and liberty of the 
individual against the arbitrary or unfair 
exercise of managerial prerogatives. 
Looked at this way, the Human Rights 
Bill could be not simply a fashion but a 
turning point.
Whatever one's views about this, one
point is beyond question. Kahn-Freund 
said 21 years ago, that:
'to enact a Bill of Rights may involve a 
shifting of the junction of law reform from 
Parliament, the Government and the Law 
Commission to the Bench and the Bar.' 
([1970] CLJ 240, 270)
The judges will have to take into 
account decisions of the European Court 
and European Commission on Human 
Rights, but will not be bound by them. 
This means that judges will have the 
power to develop European standards to 
the realities of our own labour relations. 
Ironically, it is only by developing a 
unique UK case law that the judges can 
adapt the ECHR in a way which enhances 
rather than restricts the rights of workerso
and their unions in unequal employment 
relationships. Most of the cases dealing1 o
with collective issues have come from 
countries where extensive rights to 
bargain and to strike already existed. The 
applicants were complaining of specific 
restrictions. The UK, in which 
convention rights now have to be applied, 
is a country in which there is no statutory 
system of workers' participation, most 
employees are not protected by collective 
bargaining, fewer than 30% are 
unionised, and at least one-third of the 
workforce is outside the scope of
employment protection legislation. The 
courts will need a deep understanding of 
this social reality and of comparative 
labour law if they are to 'bring rights 
home'. This involves a recognition that 
civil rights, such as freedom of 
association, are, in the words of Dickson 
CJ's dissent in Re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act (1987) 38 DLR (4th) 161, 
SCC, at p. 197:
'most essential in those circumstances when 
the individual is liable to be prejudiced by the 
action of some larger and more powerful 
entity, like the government or an employer.'
The task of the courts and tribunals 
will be to harmonise collective interests 
and individual rights, so as to support the 
rights of workers rather than to 
undermine them. @
Professor Bob Hepple QC
Master of Clare College and Professor of Law, 
University of Cambridge
Incapacity and contracts - the European dimension
by Dr Volker Lipp
English law as to mental incapacity and 
the protection of incapable adults in 
respect of their person and their property 
has been under review by the Law 
Commission for England and Wales since 
1989, as has the Scottish law by the 
Scottish Law Commission since 1990,
with broad public participation. 
However, the international and, in 
particular, the European dimension of 
these issues is largely unknown.
DOMESTIC LAWS
Today there is no common European 
law of persons, nor are there common 
rules in the conflict of laws regarding theo o
law of persons. The rules governing 
capacity, mental disorder and the 
protection and legal representation of 
incapable adults and of minors are quite 
different in Europe, both in the 
respective domestic laws and in private 
international law. Law reforms in various 
European countries have widened the 
differences in the respective domestic
laws. So may the application of the 
proper law doctrine to the question of 
capacity to contract in English law within 
the field of private international law.
LAW REFORM IN EUROPE
Reform of laws relating to the protection 






The English and Scottish Law 
Commissions put forward further 
proposals for reform in 1995
23
